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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT FAULT-PUBLIC CONTRACr JoBs.-The de-
fendant contractor was building a bridge for the state. The plaintiff's dwelling
was near the site of the proposed bridge. The defendant's workmen had to blast
through solid rock to carry on their work. The plaintiff's house was severely
shaken by the blasts, the walls and foundation were cracked. The plaintiff
brought an action against the contractor relying on the local nuisance statute
(M'fason's Minnesota Stat. 1927, § 9580) to support recovery. After a verdict for
the plaintiff, and on appeal from an order denying the defendant's motion for
judgment, Held, the order denying the defendant's motion should be reversed;
the nuisance statute could not be made effective against the state or its agents.
Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co., (Minn., 1934) 256 .W. 96.
A property owner situated like the plaintiff in the instant case may have sev-
eral probable bases upon which to support recovery against a defendant in the
position of the contractor. He may be able to show that rocks and debris have
been cast upon his premises by the blasting. In the opinion of some courts that
is like a common lav trespass. The plaintiff may recover substantial compen-
sation from the contractor, and he does not have to show anything more to sug-
gest fault on the part of the workmen. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159, 51 Am.
Dec. 279 (1849); Currier v. Essex Co., (Mass., 1934) 189 N.E. 35, where the
court was willing to enjoin the blasting because of the probable consequences;
cf. Green v. General Petroleum Corp'n., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). The
plaintiff in the instant case did recover some compensation because rocks were
cast upon his premises and the defendant raised no objection thereto on the
appeal.
The property owner; may be able to get enough facts before the jury to per-
mit them to find that the defendant's workmen have not done everything they
might have done to protect persons and things in the neighborhood from the con-
sequences of the blasts. If that is the plaintiff's case, he has shown that the
workmen are at fault; the contractor is responsible because he is the employer.
See, Thomnpson-Caldwell Co. v. Young, 294 Fed. 145 (C.S.A., 4th, 1923). Where
the plaintiff-property-owner can show neither fault on the part of the workmen
nor anything comparable to a physical trespass, he is without a remedy unless
the court is willing to impose upon the defendant-contractor an absolute re-
sponsibility where no one personally has been at fault. Some courts are willing
to go that far. Landen v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970
(1914) ; Fagen v. Silver, 57 Mont. 427, 188 Pac. 900 (1920). To suggest that the
contractor's operations constitute a "public" or "private" nuisance is to offer a
figurative explanation for the imposing of an absolute responsibility. The dan-
gerous nature of the work, the virtual impossibility of carrying it on without
causing serious physical consequences to persons or things in the vicinity, the
proximity of the property affected, are factors which the court may take into
consideration when deciding to impose responsibility upon the defendant where
there has been no showing of fault.
Where the defendant-contractor is engaged in public construction work the
court may hesitate to impose an absolute responsibility upon him. That was the
situation in the instant case. Cf. Ockermnan v. Woodward, 165 Ky. 752, 178 S.W.
1100, L.R.A. 1916 A, 1005 (1915) ; Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y.
156, 31 N.E. 328, 17 L.R.A. 220, 30 Am. St. Rep. 649 (1892). Perhaps the court
feels that the state is so interested in getting the job done that residents in'the
community must suffer the necessary consequences where no one has been per-
sonally at fault. Where the local residents have suffered a temporary inconven-
ience such a decision is understandable. Where these local residents have sus-
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tained injuries to property interests like those sustained by the plaintiff in the
present case the situation is different. Has the plaintiff's property been takefi
from him without compensation? Has he been denied due process? Does the
record in a case like this present any federal questoin? It is submitted that the
majority opinion, which follows accepted grooves of legal thinking, has over-
looked the realities of the case to present an artificial analysis. The idea of nui-
sance is used (perhaps because of the plaintiff's own presentation) to cover the
choice which the court in fact had to make, the fixing or refusing to fix respon-
sibility upon the defendant when no one was at fault. That the job is a public
contract job ought not be important if any other contractor in the position of
the defendant would be held to this absolute responsibility.
HENRY G. SCHROEDER.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACr-RIGHT TO MAINTAIN COMMON-LAw ACTION.
-An employee in the course of his employment was injured by the discharge of
a spring gun set by his employer. Compensation was awarded under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Subsequently the employee brought an action against
the employer at common law for the same injury. The right to bring such an
action is preserved where the injury is the result of deliberate intention of the
employer. Oregon Code (1930) § 49-1828. The employer defended on the grounds
that deliberate intention was not shown. The trial court found for the plaintiff.
On appeal, Held, judgment affirmed. Weis v. Allen, (Ore., 1934) 35 P. (2d) 478.
Where the right to compensation under the Wisconsin Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exists, [Wis. Stats., (1933) § 102.03], the Act purports to make recov-
ery under it the exclusive remedy against the employer. Milwaukee v. Althoff,
156 Wis. 68, 145 N.W. 238 (1914). It is the exclusive remedy for injuries for
which the employer might have been liable at common law by reason of his
failure to exercise ordinary care or to comply with a safety provision as well
as from the negligent acts of a fellow servant. See, Knoll v. Schaeler, 180 Wis.
66, 69, 192 N.W. 399 (1923). [Where the injury is traceable to a violation by
the employer of a safety statute the award is increased 15 per cent. Wis. Stats.,
(1923), § 102.57.] Being under the Act does not affect the right of the employee
to maintain an action in tort against any other party for an injury. Wis. Stats.,
(1933) § 102.29 (1) (a); McGonigle v. Gryphan, 201 Wis. 260, 229 N.W. 81
(1930). It is no defense to such an action to show that the plaintiff hat received
an award under the Act for the injury. Sheban v. A. M. Castle Co., 185 Wis.
282, 201 N.W. 379 (1924). Where the Workmen's Compensation Act is silent as
to the preservation of common law recovery for injuries resulting from the
deliberate intention of the employer, (and it is silent in Wisconsin), it is no
defense to an action, brought by an employe for assult committed on him by the
employer, to assert that the employee's sole remedy is under the Act. Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233, 72 A.L.R. 108 (1930) (the court said
that the relationship of employer and employee did not exist when the assault
was perpetrated). In that case there was dicta to the effect that the employee
must make an election either to be compensated under th Act or to rely on his
common law acion. Cf. Note L.R.A. 1916 F, 987 (assault by fellow employee,
foreman, etc., compensable under the Act.).
ADAM E. WOLF.
